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A B S T R A C T
Fairness is a relative concept with multiple, subjective and competing notions of what it is, how to
achieve it, and for which beneﬁciaries. Fairtrade International’s collaborative efforts to develop a
standard to certify Fairtrade Carbon Credits (FCCs) brought together multiple stakeholders in a
deliberative context. This paper uses Q methodology to empirically assess the notions of fairness this
wider consultation group held. Three distinct ‘factors’ (or perspectives) are identiﬁed, and discussed in
relation to a multi-dimensional framework for exploring fairness. The ﬁrst factor prioritises
development delivered through organisations, participation in decision-making and use of minimum
prices to adjust trade imbalances. The second factor conceptualises a non-exclusive approach
maximising generation and sales of FCCs, involving a commodity chain where everyone performs
their optimum function with ﬁnancial transparency and information-sharing to facilitate negotiations.
The third factor involves minimising intervention, allowing carbon commodity chains and project set-
ups to function efﬁciently, and make their own adjustments to enhance beneﬁts access and quality
received by beneﬁciaries. The three factors reﬂect debates within carbon and fair trade spheres about
who should be playing which roles, who should be accessing which beneﬁts, and how people should be
supported to interact on an uneven playing ﬁeld. Communicating ﬁndings to standards organisations
enables a more open and inclusive policy process. Our research provides a critical reﬂection on these
plural notions of fairness, identifying areas of (dis)agreement within the FCC dialogue, and provides a
wider, yet manageable, set of inputs for supporting the FCC process during its inception and subsequent
implementation. Clearer deﬁnitions of ‘‘fairness’’ are also useful for standards organisations in reviewing
ex post whether ‘‘fairness’’ goals have been met.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Carbon markets have been heralded as an opportunity for
ﬁnancing low carbon development in the global south whilst
mitigating climate change, but are simultaneously the object of
major discussions about fairness (Howard et al., 2015). Concerns
have been raised regarding the burdens, beneﬁts and positioning of
local communities involved in international carbon projects
(Mathur et al., 2014, Melo et al., 2014) and the technical
complexity of offset mechanisms, which create dependency on
outside expertise for audit that can shape and determine the* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 7570 105 135.
E-mail addresses: R.J.Howard12@leeds.ac.uk, joyfulbeeing@yahoo.fr
(R.J. Howard), a.m.tallontire@leeds.ac.uk (A.M. Tallontire), L.Stringer@leeds.ac.uk
(L.C. Stringer), robert.marchant@york.ac.uk (R.A. Marchant).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2015.11.009
1462-9011/ 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articcharacter of carbon market access (Corbera and Brown, 2010,
Lansing, 2013). In 2011 the ethical standards body Fairtrade
International committed to address fairness within the climate
change arena with a new fair trade commodity named ‘‘Fairtrade
Carbon Credits’’ (FCCs) (Mhene, 2012). A strategic collaboration
with the Gold Standard Foundation1 began in 2012 to develop a
new joint certiﬁcation scheme (Gold Standard Foundation and
Fairtrade International, 2012) expected to redress rural communi-
ties’ unequal access to, information about, and capacity to beneﬁt
from, the carbon market (Howard et al., 2015). The two
organisations pooled their expertise and elicited inputs from
multiple stakeholders familiar either with the carbon market or
with Fairtrade to develop a Fairtrade Climate Standard for projects1 Gold Standard is a non-proﬁt foundation coordinating a certiﬁcation standard
for carbon offset projects which also contribute to sustainable development.
le under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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ties in the production of FCCs2.
Fairtrade International is one of many Standard Setting
Organisations (SSOs) addressing fairness, equity and justice in
commodity markets through people-centred approaches aimed at
poverty alleviation, participation and empowerment (Melo et al.,
2014, Phillips, 2014). However, actual impacts are shaped by the
priorities driving standards and the multiple contexts where they
are applied (Mcdermott, 2013, Nelson and Martin, 2015).
Operating both within and against the market, and deploying a
technocratic logic of measurement, SSOs are in a place of inherent
contradiction and have the potential to result in continued
marginalisation of local communities, centralised control and
reinforcing of dominant interests, despite efforts to avoid these
outcomes (Melo et al., 2014). Fairtrade International is a
membership-based organisation providing opportunities for its
1.5millionmember farmers andworkers and 19National Fairtrade
Organisations to inﬂuence major decisions via a number of
channels. Nevertheless, its sheer size, stakeholder diversity,
political and historical foundations and subsequent trajectory
into mainstream markets and new commodities render it a
heterogeneous, evolving movement characterised by a number of
fault lines (see table A3 for a summary) and recent scissions
between different cohorts who seek to represent, advocate, dilute
or codify different notions of fairness in different ways (Bennett,
2012, Doherty et al., 2013, Raynolds and Greenﬁeld, 2015, Renard
and Loconto, 2013). Introduction of carbon credits into the
Fairtrade3 system triggers new debates about what is fair about
fair trade and carbon credits, both within and outside of the
movement.
This paper responds to calls to unpack the normative ideals, in
particular fairness evoked by SSOs in the carbon market (Page,
2012) and used differently by different actors in depoliticised,
technocratic, standardised and instrumental ways which threaten
the achievement of fairer outcomes (Melo et al., 2014, Mcdermott
et al., 2012). Without clear deﬁnitions, such concepts are open to
co-opting or dilution by powerful actors (Leach et al., 2010).
Attempts by SSOs to set ‘rules’ or standards on what constitutes
‘fairness’ necessarily involves legitimising some deﬁnitions over
others and ‘closing down’ debates concerning its boundaries
(Renard, 2005, Renard and Loconto, 2013). Nevertheless, as
standards for fairness are set, it is important to critically assess
what is understood by fairness in order to establish which types of
fairness outcomes the standards are designed to achieve, for
whom, how and why, and to enable the future evaluation of these
outcomes (Mcdermott et al., 2013).
Following Schroeder and McDermott (2014), we view fairness
as socially constructed. We use Q methodology (‘Q’) to empirically
analyse how the term is differently understood and deployed by
people contributing to the development of the Fairtrade Climate
Standard. Q enables analysis of subjectivity in an open, yet
structured and statistically interpretable form (Curry et al., 2013,
Setiawan and Cuppen, 2013) and can be used to identify a range of
voices, accounts and understandings (Barry and Proops, 1999). It
‘opens up’ inputs and reﬂexivity in policy-making processes (Leach
et al., 2010, Ockwell, 2008), facilitating dialogue (Focht and Lawler,
2000) and enhancing policy implementation processes (Barry and2 This was designed as an add-on label to the Gold Standard certiﬁcation, for
projects whichmeet the social, environmental, trade and carbon accounting criteria
of both organisations.
3 Note thatwe use ‘Fairtrade’ to refer to the product certiﬁcation system operated
by Fairtrade International, including all or any part of the activities of FLO ev, FLO-
CERT, Fairtrade producer networks, national Fairtrade organisations and Fairtrade
marketing organisations. We use ‘fair trade’ to refer to the broader movement,
including activities under the umbrella of Fairtrade International and activities led
by organisations independent of its system.Proops, 1999).We drawon an adapted version ofMcDermott et al’s
(2013) Multi-Dimensional Equity Framework to guide statement
selection and interpretation of results.
2. Empirical analyses of fairness within the carbonmarket and
Fairtrade
We refer to fairness as encompassing both justice and equity
(Schroeder and Mcdermott, 2014) and reﬂecting the language of
the people involved in the standard-setting process. When justice,
equity and fairness are seen as socially constructed, characterising
how they are framed and understood by different actors is more
important than the choice of terms (Schroeder and Mcdermott,
2014). Empirical analyses of justice, equity and fairness differ from
normative approaches (e.g. Rawls, 2009). Rather than starting from
a theoretical position, and applying universal principles to
particular contexts, they start from actual claims and the notions
used to support these (Sikor et al., 2014). They acknowledge that
multiple and competing notions co-exist that are experiential,
context-dependent and vary according to the kinds of resources
and responsibilities being shared (Sikor et al., 2014, Mcdermott
et al., 2013). Sikor et al. (2014) identify two overlapping lines of
enquiry in empirical analyses of justice (or fairness). The ﬁrst
involves identifying dominant notions, exploring their appropri-
ateness in different contexts, and analysing their operation in
practice. The second involves characterising different stakeholders’
notions in particular contexts, examining their justiﬁcations
within public discourse, and then identifying how different
notions gain or lose ground. Together they enable a better
understanding of the interplay between different notions, contexts
and practice, and the tensions between multiple notions upheld
maintained at different scales. While we address both lines of
enquiry in ongoing work, this paper aligns more with the second
one, by exploring notions upheld by stakeholders in the public
deliberative contexts of standard-setting and providing a bench-
mark for assessingwhich ones eventuallymake it into the standard
and why.
McDermott et al. (2013) developed a Multi-Dimensional Equity
Framework as a tool (see Fig. A1) to guide systematic empirical
analyses of equity, enabling examination, assessment and planning
of impacts on equity brought about by changes in the value of
ecosystem services. The framework is composed of three dimen-
sions (contextual, procedural and distributional equity) that form
the core content of equity (what counts as equity). The core is
surrounded by three concentric layers of framing questions: (1) the
scale and target of concern (who counts as a subject of equity), (2)
the goals of an intervention with respect to equity (why equity)
and (3) how decisions about each of these dimensions are taken
(parameters of equity). It has been applied to explore fairness
within Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation or
‘REDD + ’ debates and interventions across scales (e.g. Di Gregorio
et al., 2013, Mulyani and Jepson, 2015) to consent procedures
within mining and forestry (Mahanty and McDermott, 2013);
public participation in European biodiversity governance (Palo-
niemi et al., 2015); gender equity within climate ﬁnance (Wong,
2014) and to certiﬁcation schemes for sustainable commodities
and carbon sequestration projects (Mcdermott, 2013, Pinto and
Mcdermott, 2013). Some applications have drawn on the complete
framework while others have used it in part. It has also been
combined with complementary frameworks and additional con-
cepts (e.g. Paloniemi et al., 2015, Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2012).
Several applications miss out ‘contextual equity’, despite some
ﬁnding that this dimension poses the biggest challenges (e.g.
Ituarte-Lima et al., 2014). Its omission suggests it is not well
understood or clearly distinguishable from the other core
dimensions. Sikor et al. (2014) have proposed a similar framework
Table 1
the content of fairness.
Our terminology Our deﬁnition Related concepts
Fair Access Ways people can engage with and participate in
the carbonmarket via carbon projects, taking into
account power, wealth and resource distribution
differences (Sikor et al., 2013, McDermott et al.
(2013))
Contextual equity (McDermott et al.’s (2013))
Equity of access (see Corbera and Brown, 2010, Howard et al., 2015)
Fair Procedures Ways people participate in project decision-
making and/or implementation, as well as the
rules and procedures themselves.
Procedural equity (McDermott et al.’s (2013))
Equity and legitimacy of decision-making and institutions (see
Corbera and Brown, 2010, Howard et al., 2015)
Fair Beneﬁt-Sharing Ways people can beneﬁt from project outcomes,
in (non-)/monetary and (non-)/quantiﬁable
terms.
Distributional equity (McDermott et al.’s (2013))
Fair distribution of beneﬁts and equity of outcome (see Corbera and
Brown, 2010, Howard et al., 2015).
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‘recognition’ (whichMcDermott et al. classify as part of procedural
equity).
Our focus is on competing notions and discourses around
fairness which shape the standard while it is under development
and also impact on the future of fair trade itself (Renard and
Loconto, 2013). We therefore used the questions from the
framework to categorise and analyse these notions. We adapted
the framework’s wording (see Fig. A1 and Table 1) to reﬂect the
language of Fairtrade International and Gold Standard Foundation,
and the input of scholars who have theorised on fairness, justice
and equity (see Howard et al., 2015). We refer to the framework’s
goals and target of fairness, and how the parameters of fairness are
set. We deploy this latter dimension in a narrower sense in our
selection of statements and analysis of results, looking only at how
parameters for trading relationships and pricing are set. Our
conception of the content of fairness is outlined in Table 1.
3. Methodology
We followed six methodological steps in our Q study.
3.1. Collation of the ‘‘Fair Carbon’’ concourse
A Q concourse is a body of literature which aims to represent
the full range of ideas and opinions on the issue under study. Our
concourse, deﬁned as opinion on what ‘‘fairness’’ would mean in
the (hypothetical4) context of an FCC project, was collated from
materials collected or accessed during observations of the
standards development process (September 2013–March 2014).
Details of these materials are listed in the supplementary material.
3.2. Reﬁnement of concourse into a ‘‘Q set’’
Concourse materials were analysed inductively using Atlas.ti
software. 119 coded5 extracts were derived and used to generate
an initial set of 58 statements, which were edited down (see
supplementarymaterial) to 40 statements expected to trigger both
positive and negative reactions (followingWebler et al., 2009). We
conducted a pilot Q-sort with one person who was working for a
carbon project advisory company but had conducted preliminary
research for the Fairtrade Climate Standard and taken part in
multiple stakeholder meetings. Using this feedback, we adjusted4 The standard was still under development and no projects had yet been
certiﬁed.
5 Five codes were theoretically inspired by our adapted version of McDermott
et al.’s (2014) equity framework (fair access, fair beneﬁt-sharing, fair procedures,
the target of fairness and the goal of fairness), and threewere developed inductively
(generic fairness, issues of ownership of the credits and trade-offs involved in
delivering fairness).the set. Adjustment included rewording ambiguous, general or
loaded statements, returning to the concourse and re-coding it for
‘parameters of fairness’ (the outer layer in the equity framework)
and selecting statements referring speciﬁcally to pricing mecha-
nisms. The ﬁnal set contained 40 statements. We ensured the
theoretical breadth by cross-checking the statements against six
thematic categories, based on our adapted version of McDermott
et al.’s (2013) equity framework, selecting at least ﬁve from each
category, although some covered more than one category
(Tables A1 and A2). Following Lansing (2013), we chose not to
make these categories explicit to participants because we did not
want to conﬁne their reactions.
3.3. Purposive selection of participants
Q studies select participants based on a diversity of perspectives
(Setiawan and Cuppen, 2013) rather than representativeness or
quantity (Eden et al., 2005). In our case, most participants were
purposively selected based on their views expressed during
interventions in meetings, workshops and informal discussions
as part of the standard-setting process6. Two additional partici-
pants from the fair trade systemwere encouraged to participate by
their colleagues. Of 36 invited, 26 participated (see Table 2): 23 had
been involved in at least one stakeholdermeeting connected to the
standard development; the remainder had received information
about the process via colleagues who had been involved. We
ensured participants had experience of Fairtrade (nine were
licensees, certiﬁers, or staff at Fairtrade International or any of its
member organisations) and/or experience of Gold Standard or
carbon projects certiﬁed by other standards bodies (17 were
involved in promoting, ﬁnancing and/or implementing projects, or
developing new Gold Standard Foundation standards). Seven had
practical experience of carbon projects involving Fairtrade
producers and ﬁtted in both categories.
3.4. Q-sorts and accompanying interviews
DuringMay-September 2014, 26 Q interviews were conducted:
20 were face-to-face, using printed cards and a distribution grid,
and six were via Skype, using Q-sort software application Flash Q
(Hackert and Braehler, 2007). Participants were encouraged to
think out loud during their ﬁrst reading and sorting of statements
into ‘agree, disagree and neutral’. This rich interview data helped
us to understand how the statement was being interpreted and
why, and highlighted statements or words that were ambiguous6 Overall, this process involved several meetings and workshops led by Fairtrade
International with stakeholders from fair trade producer organisations; fair trade
marketing organisations; and NGOs, businesses and consultants involved in carbon
project ﬁnancing, development, implementation or retailing of credits.
Table 2
Participants and degree of correlation with each factor (F1, F2 and F3).
Based F1 F2 F3
Participants loading signiﬁcantly on F1
Staff of Fairtrade International Europe 0.743a 0.193 0.293
Staff of Fairtrade International Europe 0.797a -0.029 0.012
Carbon project ﬁnancer and seller of credits Europe 0.532a -0.001 0.027
Staff of fair trade marketing organisation Europe 0.618a 0.103 0.013
Carbon project advisor Europe 0.548a 0.282 0.250
Staff of fair trade marketing organisation Europe 0.643a -0.031 0.163
Staff of fair trade marketing organisation Europe 0.493a -0.084 0.389
Carbon project technician/advisor Europe 0.595a 0.126 0.131
Participants loading signiﬁcantly on F2
Carbon project implementing partner Africa 0.027 0.660a 0.326
Fair trade licensee and carbon project implementer Africa 0.142 0.789a 0.064
Carbon project implementing partner Africa 0.115 0.562a 0.253
Carbon project advisor Africa 0.219 0.519a 0.034
Staff of fair trade producer network Africa 0.103 0.599a 0.081
Carbon project implementer Africa 0.258 0.648a 0.263
Carbon project implementer Africa 0.050 0.608a 0.265
Carbon project developer and advisor Europe 0.371 0.514a 0.060
Carbon project implementer Africa 0.267 0.427a 0.256
Participants loading signiﬁcantly on F3
Staff of research organisation Africa 0.064 0.179 0.645a
Low-carbon technology promoter U.S. 0.045 0.289 0.668a
Carbon project owner U.S. 0.019 0.116 0.491a
Carbon project advisor and implementer Africa 0.090 0.032 0.725a
Staff of certiﬁcation body Europe 0.363 0.108 0.577a
Confounders (loading signiﬁcantly on more than one factor)
Staff of Fairtrade International Europe 0.583a 0.187 0.465a
Carbon project technician/advisor Europe 0.129 0.508a 0.472a
Staff of standards organisation Europe 0.442a 0.004 0.644a
Non-loaders (loading signiﬁcantly on none of the factors)
Carbon project advisor and implementer Africa 0.365 0.332 0.031
a = signiﬁcant sorts (0.41 at the p< 0.01 level).
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positioning them on a 9-columned forced normal distribution
grid, indicating a spectrum ranging from most disagree to most
agree (Fig. 1), helping to reveal participants’ preferences (Brown
et al., 2014, Webler et al., 2009). Participants were then asked
open-ended questions about their positioning logic, helping us
view each Q-sort from their perspective.
3.5. Correlation and factor analysis of Q-sorts
Q-Analysis identiﬁes similar sorting patterns in the Q-sorts,
meaning that participants share some distinct commonalities in
their perceptions. Analysis of the 26 Q-sorts used PQ method
software, version 2.35 (Schmolck, 2002). A 26  26 correlation
matrix of the Q-sorts was produced and subjected to factor
extraction using Principal Components Analysis (PCA) and[(Fig._1)TD$FIG]Fig. 1. The Q-sort grid. We distinguished columns using letters, but the equivalent
numerals used in the Q data analysis software package (and used later in the
presentation of the results) are given in brackets.Varimax rotation. PCA considers the speciﬁcity of individual
sorts as well as the commonality between sorts (Webler et al.,
2009)7. Rotation is applied to ensure each factor offers ‘the best
possible, or most meaningful vantage point from which to view
the subject matter’ (Watts and Stenner, 2012:142). Following
Cairns et al, (2014), our aim was to ﬁnd a factor solution which
maximised the variance explained and number of loaders
(participants signiﬁcantly correlated with just one factor), while
minimising the number of confounders (people loading signiﬁ-
cantly on more than one factor) and non-loaders (participants
loading on no factor). We applied the principle that each factor
should contain at least two sorts loading signiﬁcantly on that
factor alone (Watts and Stenner, 2012).We compared a number of
outputs before selecting a three-factor solution. Together, the
three factors explained 46% of the study variance. Anything above
35% is ordinarily considered a sound solution in factor analysis
(Kline, 1994). 22 participants’ Q-sorts loaded signiﬁcantly on one
of these factors, with three confounders and one non-loader.
Weighted averages of the signiﬁcant single loaders’ sort patterns
from each factor were used to create three ‘factor arrays’ or
idealised Q-sort patterns, following the same format as the
original distribution grid (Table A 2).
3.6. Qualitative results interpretation and development of ‘‘Fair
Carbon’’ narratives
We wanted to understand the factor from the perspectives of
the participants and create narratives which resonated with at7 Views differ within the Q community as to whether PCA or Centroid is most
appropriate for factor extraction, but in our case we tried them both and eventually
opted for PCA because several of the Centroid solutions contained empty factors
with no signiﬁcant loaders.
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followed Watts and Stenner’s (2012) guidelines, which involves
drafting crib sheets of statements and checking back over
demographic and post-interview data to formulate hypotheses.
We used the rich by-statement interview data to compare the
views of each signiﬁcant loader in the factor and summarise
shared views. Our interpretative narratives paid particular
attention to the interview data concerning the statements on
the crib sheet. We chose not to draw on statements which had
been understood quite differently by the various people in the
factor, and invited the highest loaders to read over them and
comment. To make explicit the links between the content of the
narratives and the original themes, we organised them according
to the headings in our adapted version of McDermott’s (2013)
equity framework. When categorising the statements, many
spannedmultiple categories, sowe chose to combine the headings
of ‘goals’ with ‘target’; and ‘access’ with ‘procedures’ in order to
avoid repetition.
4. Results
4.1. Factor 1 (F1): ‘‘Producer First’’ – Participation and Price-Floors
F1 explains 17% of the study variance and has eight signiﬁcant
loaders; ﬁve working within the Fairtrade system; three involved
in project development with experience of working with fair trade
producers in carbon projects.
4.1.1. Goals and Target of fairness
Production of FCCs should be in ‘organised communities of
disadvantaged people in the south’ (statement 2, ranked +3).
Production should not be limited to pre-existing organisations (30,
4), but well-functioning cooperatives should be targeted (14, +2).
Large structures where individual members are ‘not realistically
engaged’ and manufacturing companies that do not engage with
organised communities should not be targeted (13, +2; 38,3) and
credits should not be produced in the industrialised north (4, 4).
Buyers of FCCs must also commit to reducing their emissions (32,
3) as it would be unfair to ask poor people to reduce their
emissions if high emitters are not committing to do the same
(36, +1).
4.1.2. Access and procedures
Participation in an organisation and active involvement in a
carbon project are essential fairness components. This does not
mean that community-based or farmer organisations should
manage everything from the carbon project development process
(21, 2) to the sale of credits (25, 1). However, participating
individuals and households must be able to input into decision-
making and management (40, +4) and ﬁnancial discussions (10,
+3). Credits must transfer hands in order to be transacted, but the
ﬁrst owners should be the participating individuals and house-
holds in a project (11, +2) and the signing of an agreement with an
aggregator is insufﬁcient for the fair transfer of the credits away
from those generating the emissions savings (15, 3).
4.1.3. Beneﬁt-sharing
Focus should be on the organisation carrying out the project,
who must receive a fair price. The rest of the supply chain is not a
target of fairness (hence 19 and 20, both 0). Choices made about
budgeting and revenue do not need to be judged through a
‘fairness’ lens (see statements 9, 16, 22 and 23 all in zero)- these
should be left to the discretion project participants. Nevertheless,
intervening to ensure payments are reaching women may be
appropriate in some project contexts (39, +1).4.1.4. Parameters of fairness
Minimum prices are important in setting parameters for fairer
trade (27, +4), rather than prices being driven bymarket forces (28,
+1). This does not mean being oblivious to market prices, but
setting a ﬂoor price which would guarantee projects a carbon
credit price that covers production costs and ensuring that there is
willingness to pay.
4.2. Factor 2 (F2): functional value chain, maximum impact for people
and planet
F2 explains 15% of the study variance and has nine signiﬁcant
loaders; eight involved in African carbon projects, as implemen-
ters, advisors or project partners; and two working with fair trade
producers.
4.2.1. Goals and Target
Anyonewilling to produce carbon credits should be allowed to,
including those in heavily-emitting regions (4, +2). Entities should
not be excluded on the basis of how organised they are at the
outset (30, 4), their size (17, 3) or whether they engage with
organised communities or not (13,4). Projectswhich enable new
organisations to emerge should be rewarded (7, +3), through
encouragement and support. Well-functioning cooperatives
should be targeted (14, +2), but so should non-organised groups
as organisation may not be relevant or realistic. Although FCCs
should aim to shift more of the beneﬁts of carbon trade to
disadvantaged people in the South, the initiative should not only
target organised communities, and neither should it limit scope to
the South (2, 1). It is unfair to ask poor people to reduce
emissions if high emitters are not doing the same (36, +1) but
requiring customers to reduce their emissions is unhelpful (32,
+2) because it narrows demand and reduces opportunities for
those who are willing to carry out mitigation activities which can
beneﬁt communities, households, and more broadly the envi-
ronment.
4.2.2. Beneﬁt-sharing
The most important element of fairness in FCC projects is
ﬁnancial governance and distribution within the value chain.
Transparency of costs and margins is essential (19, +4) and can
facilitate trust between parties, encourage efﬁciency and prevent
one party from making windfalls. All parties can ensure that
everyone is reasonably compensated (20, +4). Micro-level deci-
sions about how the carbon revenue is paid and what it is used for,
e.g. whether it is paid to women or men (39, 2), and whether it
reaches particular members of the household (16, 2), are not
important components of fairness.
4.2.3. Access and procedures
Communities involved in carbon projects do not have to sell
credits by themselves (25, 3) as this is impractical and
inefﬁcient. Intermediaries have a role to play as long as they do
not take an unfair proportion of the sales revenues, (5, +3), hence
the people generating the carbon credits must be involved in the
project development process (21, 2) so they can accept and
appropriate it, and determine whether they are getting a fair deal.
‘Taking on’ the project development process should still allow for
essential technical support, especially in a project’s earlier phases.
Some loaders suggested the onus is on Fairtrade International to
make project procedures simple to facilitate people in taking
on at least part of the project development process. Providing
opportunities for individuals and households involved in a project
to participate in management decisions and ﬁnance discussions
will not be relevant (40, 0 and 10, +1) if they lack the capacity or
willingness.
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Fairtrademinimumprices (aﬂoorprice)mayhavea role toplay in
fairer trade (27, +1) butmarket forceswill naturally drive prices (28,
3) through supply, demand and negotiation between parties. A
strong bond between credit suppliers and sellers is important (33,
+2) but as one person noted, this should be a strong collaboration
enabling beneﬁt-sharing, rather than a binding chain.
4.3. Factor 3 (F3): market efﬁciency, minimum interference, more for
the project
F3 explains 14% of the study variance and has ﬁve signiﬁcant
loaders from a mixture of professional backgrounds and locations.
4.3.1. Goals and target
Development must be a primary target of FCC projects,
alongside emissions reductions (26, +4). They should not be a
mechanism for paying communities for having low carbon
footprints (3, 3) and insisting that poor people should only
reduce their emissions if high emitters havemade commitments to
reduce theirs (36, 4) would deny them beneﬁts of the carbon
market (such as accessing low carbon technology, and channelling
ﬁnance from developed countries to developing countries).
4.3.2. Beneﬁt-sharing
Fmight be achieved by enabling access to low carbon
technology and ensuring its maintenance (37, +1), provided this
comes with an appropriate design, and training provision in usage.
Technology should be sourced with users’ interests and quality in
mind: banning imported stoves is unhelpful and irrelevant (12,
4), as jobs are created in both stove production and distribution.
Fairness in delivering beneﬁts might mean making carbon
payments speciﬁcally to women (39, +1), where payments are
appropriate, and where women are doing the mitigation.
Nevertheless, this is a project design issue, and should not be
regulated by a Fairtrade standard. In land-based projects, direct
payments to farmers for the costs they incur might be desirable
(22, +1) but the money generated through a carbon project should
directly impact the long term income of participating farmers or
households (34, +3).
In an FCC value chain, each actor plays a distinct role. It is
acceptable (and perhaps preferable) for private companies to be
involved in projects and any criteria used to judge them (35, +3)
should also be applied to NGOs and non-proﬁts. Performance, not
status is important. Every party should be reasonably compensated
for what they deliver (20, +3), as per any functional business
model. As one person loading on this factor emphasised, ‘‘we are
talking about a market mechanism and if you cannot generate fair
revenue for everybody in that process, you do not have a functional
mechanism, or you’re talking about development aid’’. It is difﬁcult
to evaluate what is ‘reasonable’ or which costs and margins are
acceptable, even within the chain, but this should not be regulated
by any third party (18, 3).
4.3.3. Access and procedures
People generating carbon credits should understand what they
are involved in, but do not need to take on the carbon project
development process (21, +2). This requires a speciﬁc skill-set and is
best left to those who can do it most efﬁciently. Offering
opportunities for individuals and households involved in projects
to input into ﬁnancial and management decisions (e.g. through
consultations), is welcomed though not relevant (10 & 40, 0) if they
lack the capacity or willingness to meaningfully participate. As
credits must be transacted, ownership must be transferred away
from the people generating the emissions saving to the end buyer,
but agreements betweenpartiesmustbe clearlyunderstood (15, +4).4.3.4. Parameters
Market forces will undoubtedly drive prices (28, 2) and the
application of minimum prices is not necessarily going to make
trade fair (27, 2). As some suggested, perhaps other tools are
more practical and would not risk pricing the credits out of the
market.
5. Discussion
Reﬂexivity in policy appraisal provides space to consider the
plurality of opinions, exposing the underlying values, interests and
subjective assumptions to critical reﬂection (Ockwell, 2008).
During the development of the Fairtrade Climate Standard, plural
opinions were heard through the highly consultative process that
new Fairtrade standards undergo (see Fairtrade International,
2011), although hearing them does not necessarily mean that they
will be taken into account. Our Q study served as a novel
opportunity to enhance reﬂexivity (welcomed by participants and
staff responsible for the standard development) by facilitating a
more systematic and in-depth reﬂection on the values, interests
and assumptions underpinning their plural opinions, including the
interrelationships between different dimensions of fairness and
different ways of achieving it (particularly through instructions to
think out loud, and the sorting process itself). Input for the
Standard was principally from a group of carbon market actors
whowere initially unfamiliarwith the Fairtrade system, its history,
principal tools and approaches, and from Fairtrade staff and
licensees lacking practical experience of the carbon market, so it
could be expected that these departing differences in knowledge
and experiences might produce a diverse and potentially
irreconcilable set of inputs. The team developing the standard
would be tasked to evaluate these inputs and discriminate
between them in producing a standard which could be passed
by the Fairtrade Standards Committee. Our study’s contribution
was to provide a synthesis of different views so that the team
ﬁnalising the standard would be more aware of which ones they
were choosing to include or exclude. Publication of the results also
enhances the transparency of the standard-setting process itself by
highlighting the array of opinions provided as inputs so that those
who were not involved in the process can assess if and how these
were used.
This section discusses points of difference and convergence
between factors, linking them to the dimensions of the adapted
multi-dimensional framework, and towider debates, evidence and
lessons learned within fair trade and the carbon market. Table A
3 summarises the links between these three areas. Notably, most
people loading on F1 come fromwithin the fair trade system or are
familiarwith it. This is reﬂected across a number of areaswhere the
factor perspective resonates with key principles of fair trade
(encoded for example in the Fairtrade Theory of Change, see
Fairtrade International, 2013). However, some participants from
within Fairtrade loaded more signiﬁcantly on other factors,
reﬂecting the internal debates within the fair trade movement.
Our discussion also highlights some differences between existing
fair trade commodity chains and the way things work in carbon
projects, implying that some aspects of the Fairtrade approachmay
be under pressure to change as Fairtrade moves into carbon.
5.1. The goals and target of fairness
All factors agree that development and emissions reductions
should both be primary goals of an FCC project, but differences
emerge when exploring what is understood by ‘development’ and
where priorities are placed. For F2 and F3, the goal is to maximise
emissions reductions and carbon credit sales whilst having a
positive development impact. For F2 this is achieved by removing
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maximise the environmental impact. F3 envisages development at
the level of the households and individuals participating in the
project, through increased access to clean and usable technology,
or positive impacts on household income. F1 prioritises develop-
ment in the global south, achieved principally through participa-
tion in the project as organisational members: organisations being
the target of support and beneﬁts.
Disagreements on the target of fairness are clearest between F1
and F2 regarding the necessity of being organised, inclusion of
projects in the north, and criteria for customers buying credits.
Similar debates are articulatedwithin fair trade, most visibly in the
recent departure of Fair Trade USA from the Fairtrade International
system. F2 ﬁts more with Fair Trade USA’s strategy of growing the
market for fair trade products so that more producers will beneﬁt
(involving certifying farmers who are not democratically orga-
nised, plantations in sectors which Fairtrade International limits to
small producers, and Northern producers). This has been widely
condemned by Fairtrade International and other members of the
movement because of the emphasis on market goals over
movement principles (Raynolds and Greenﬁeld, 2015).
Disagreements about the relevance of organisation between F1
and F2 loaders are a reminder that ﬁrmly rooted assumptions
about ‘organisation’ need to be reality-tested by attending to the
speciﬁcities of carbon credits (how they are produced and by
whom) compared to existing fair trade commodities. Producer
organisations form the roots of the fair trademovement, beginning
with coffee cooperatives in Mexico (Smith and Vanderhoff, 2013)
and these roots continue to shape organisational preferences
30 years on. Producer organisations feature strongly in Fairtrade
International’s Theory of Change (Fairtrade International, 2013),
which articulates how fair trade interventions result in impacts.
However, scholars have underlined the need to attend to the
geographical and cultural speciﬁcity of different commodities and
modes of organisation (Nelson and Martin, 2015, Mcewan et al.,
2014). For example, African countries such as Ghana, Tanzania and
Kenya had very different histories of cooperative formation
compared to Latin America, leaving a legacy of very large
cooperatives and cooperative unions initiated by colonial govern-
ments,many ofwhich are struggling or facing particular challenges
(Tallontire, 2015).
Disagreements about where carbon credits should be produced
reﬂect ethical debates about neo-colonialism in carbon and fair
trade arenas. Carbon debates are polarised by those who see
carbon trading as northern customers dumping responsibility on
the global south, and those who see it as an opportunity for people
in the south to beneﬁt from climate ﬁnance (Howard et al., 2015).
Obliging customers to reduce their own emissions before buying
credits (F1) is a strategy to respond to this critique even if it would
mean limiting the size of the market (F2). Fair trade’s emphasis on
cash crops produced in the global south for northern markets
proliferates colonial commodity circuits despite efforts to trans-
form production relations (Raynolds and Greenﬁeld, 2015),
although the polarisation of producers and consumers is gradually
changing with the development of fair trade markets in Africa
(Keahey, 2015) and Latin America (Renard and Loconto, 2013).
5.2. The content of fairness
5.2.1. Fair beneﬁt-sharing
The three factors diverge on where to measure fair beneﬁt-
sharing (at the household level (F3); within the organisation
producing the credits (F1); and across the commodity chain (F2
and F3)). F1 echoes the fair trade approach which is relatively
prescriptive on fair beneﬁt-sharing but limits the scope to
producer cooperatives and worker associations (FairtradeInternational, 2013, Mcdermott, 2013). Fair trade impact studies
normally assess household level changes too, but lack of
attention in F1 to individual households may be because FCCs
cannot be expected to generate the same level of direct
household income as other fair trade commodities, as the carbon
revenue is often absorbed further along the chain (Howard et al.,
2015). Despite their bearing on available income, all factors
agreed that intermediaries can be involved in an FCC commodity
chain. However, while F1 advocates limiting them, F2 and F3
embrace them and advocate reasonable compensation. F1 maps
onto the fair trade approach, which in the coffee sector has been
focused on enabling primary producers to engage in ‘direct’ trade
with shorter trading chains while F2 and F3 ﬁt more with other
sustainability standards such as by the Forest Stewardship
Council which often include many intermediaries (Taylor, 2005).
Nevertheless, the role of intermediaries has been legitimated
within Fairtrade standards, in the Contract Production standard
developed by Fairtrade International for particular geographical
areas and products, and in the Independent Smallholder standard
developed by Fair Trade USA although there is not yet enough
evidence of the intermediary playing the intended role. Within
carbon projects, Boyd (2009) suggests that NGOs can sometimes
serve as intermediary institutions, bridging the disconnect
between the values and rhetoric of local resource users, and
the global institutions that set the rules, however, evidence on
how this would occur in practice is again lacking (Lansing, 2013).
5.2.2. Fair access and procedures
All factors agreed that carbon project participants should be
involved in design and implementation but recognised that
households, farmers or community members may initially lack
speciﬁc capacity or skills to engage effectively. However, while F1
aims to build capacities, F2 and F3 see limited capacity as reasons
for continued involvement of additional parties. F2 recognises the
need to shift power by enhancing project participants’ negotiation
capacities, whereas F3 does not advocate for changes in capabili-
ties or power. Notably, the extent to which the shift in capabilities
and power is possible depends greatly on context as well as
motivations of actors involved. The risk with fair trade is that
approaches focusing on political empowerment only empower
those producers that already have more resources. Equally,
without political empowerment, once dependencies become
institutionalised, there may be few opportunities to develop
socially and institutionally, and to challenge the trading terms and
positioning in the value chain (Tallontire and Nelson, 2013).
Rationales for participation varied between the factors, from
philosophical (F1) to pragmatic or even instrumental (F3), and
from being a means to eventually take on more tasks (F1) or a tool
for enhancing negotiation (F2), to a means of strengthening
participants’ commitment to emissions reductions (F3). These
differences resonate with Melo et al.’s (2014) ﬁnding that different
carbon projects certiﬁed by the Climate, Community and
Biodiversity Standard deployed participation in different ways.
While participation is commonly emphasised in standards and
project design documents and is required for projects to achieve
bothmitigation and community beneﬁts, interpretations are wide-
ranging, andwithout clear deﬁnitions and prescriptions, the notion
risks being used instrumentally (Melo et al., 2014). Also with
respect to carbon projects based on Reduced Emissions from
Deforestation and Degradation (REDD), Mcdermott et al. (2012)
note that safeguards (including participation) intended to enhance
equity are deployed in distinct ways by different actors with
different interests. Nevertheless, Lansing (2013) observes that
project designs are necessarily highly technical, require standar-
dised procedures and often exclude different perspectives and
collaborative project design and implementation is difﬁcult.
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Different reactions to ‘minimum prices’ point to different
understandings of what this mechanismmight look like andwhat
it could achieve when applied to carbon. Some positive reactions
(F1) were based on experience of the beneﬁts it brings when
applied to agricultural commodities, and awareness of the
complexity and rigour used to work out prices. Other ambivalent
or negative reactions (F2 and F3) came from people who had
limited experience of Fairtrade minimum prices or who were
aware of the difﬁculties in challenging market forces or ﬁnding
buyers willing to pay higher prices, following their experiences of
carbon price slump in recent years. One said shewas not in favour
ofminimumpriceswasbecause shewasnot from fair trade,where
she perceived that minimum prices are ‘in their DNA’. However,
someparticipants fromwithin fair tradewere also unsure how the
tool would work when applied to carbon. Minimum prices set
Fairtrade standards apart from other sustainability standards and
attempt to modify conventional trading relations (Taylor, 2005).
However, this is harder to achieve in capital intensive, organi-
sationally complex networks (Raynolds andGreenﬁeld, 2015) and
depends on actors in the supply chain and other contextual
aspects inherent to the commodity and the industry (Nelson and
Martin, 2015). Furthermore, corporate pressure can dilute key fair
trade principles including minimum prices (Doherty et al., 2013).
Carbon projects are not only capital intensive and organisation-
ally complex but also constitute a speciﬁc context for applying
minimum prices, and it is not obvious who would receive them.
People in F3 emphasised that payments to individuals are not
always appropriate, especially when attached to the use of an
energy-saving appliance such as a cook-stove or solar light, and
are better translated into subsidies or services. In this case, a
minimum price would go to the entity implementing the project
and as yet, these entities are primarily NGOs and foreign or
national businesses. For F1, these actors are not the ‘target’ of
fairness. Certain types of carbon projects such as afforestation/
reforestation often involve complex ﬁnancial ﬂows where
investors commit to forwarding payments to project participants
several years ahead of the carbon credits being fungible (e.g.
Fisher, 2012, Jindal et al., 2012). This requires agreements and risk
management mechanisms speciﬁc to each project. While there
may be valid reasons for not applying minimum prices to carbon
credits, this would be very controversial within the fair trade
movement and would set a precedent potentially shaping its
whole trajectory. The backdrop of low carbon market prices
suggests the need for tools to ensure that carbon projects can
cover costs and hedge risks, but willingness to pay higher prices
would also be necessary.
6. Conclusion
Deﬁnitions of fairness and how to achieve it are multiple and
contested in the context of carbonmarkets and evenwithin the fair
trade movement. This paper has contributed to what Schlosberg
calls a ‘‘plural yet uniﬁed theory and practice of justice’’
(2004:517), making sense of empirical notions of fairness by
using a conceptual framework and linking ﬁndings to ongoing
debates within the theory and practice of fair trade and fairness in
carbon projects. It has also advanced the body of empirical
knowledge on multiple notions of fairness in the context of
environmental governance, by exposing the views which have
contributed to the development of the Fairtrade Climate Standard
for FCCs. Crucially, we have shown that there is no clear consensus
between participants’ notions, and that whichever version of
fairness is eventually codiﬁed in the published standard cannot be
assumed to represent the views of all who took part in shaping thestandard. A next step for research is to use the factors as a
benchmark for assessing which if any of them are visible in the
eventual standard when it is published, as this is a key indicator of
how notions gain or lose ground in public discourse and an
important extension of this empirical line of enquiry we have
begun to unravel (Sikor et al., 2014). Further research is also
needed to explore the salience of these viewpoints amongst
stakeholders who did not take part in the Q study but whose views
could be equally inﬂuential on the legitimacy, success or failure of
the eventual standard. These include representatives of civil
society organisations and NGOs who have taken strong ethical
positions on the carbon market, existing Fairtrade market actors,
and member organisations of Fairtrade International who chose
not to provide input for the standard or who could not take part in
the study for reasons including that it was not conducted in an
appropriate language.
Our approach served to open up discussion and provide clarity
on some of the key fault lines in both debates (see A3). Fairtrade
International’s efforts to develop the Fairtrade Climate Standard
with the support of external stakeholders illustrates that some of
the pre-existing internal contestations within the fair trade
movement have beenmirrored in disagreements between people
both from within and outside the movement concerning the new
fair trade commodity of carbon credits. This suggests both that
the development of the FCC standard is an opportunemoment for
taking these debates seriously, and also that the choices made are
likely to shape the future of Fairtrade (Renard and Loconto,
2013), either by creating precedents or by furthering the status
quo. Amongst the participants of the Q study, disagreements
persisted within each layer of our adapted multi-dimensional
framework. Regarding fair access and procedures, it is unclear
how much carbon project participants can and should be
expected or supported to take on more project tasks. The
fairness of beneﬁt-sharing is subject to disagreements about
whether beneﬁts should be targeted and monitored at the
household level, within a producer-led organisation carrying out
the project, or across the entire value chain. The goal and target of
fairness in the context of a Fairtrade Carbon Credits project is
simultaneously understood to be about mitigation impact,
technology dissemination and development in the global south,
but it is unclear how these should be weighted and which should
be prioritised. With respect to parameter-setting, participants
disagree on whether the fair trade approach of minimum prices is
applicable and whether they will make the trade of carbon
credits fair.
It is important to be aware of the views and assumptions behind
the experts and/or lobbyists who inﬂuence policy and standards,
and social scientists have a role to play in analysing policy-change
in a way that fosters stakeholder engagement, learning and
feedback loops (Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2012), this research
being an example of that. A potential extension of our methodo-
logical approach and results within the standards making context
could involve creating a deliberative forum bringing together
people from each of the factors to debate on these unresolved
issues in a discursively representative setting (see e.g. Cuppen
et al., 2010, Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008). While it cannot be
expected, nor would it be necessary, that there is consensus on the
content, goals, targets and how the parameters of fairness are set, it
remains important to acknowledge these differences, to identify
whose priorities and deﬁnitions are included or excluded in
standards and projects aiming to enhance fairness, and to ﬁnd
ways of rebalancing this if it does not ﬁt with the original
intentions or has unintended consequences. We echo McDermott
et al.’s (2013) concern that if the process of deﬁning equity or
fairness (the ﬁnal layer of the framework) is given insufﬁcient
attention it is likely to remain a reﬂection of prevailing discourses
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limited in their scope to transform unfair situations and impact the
beneﬁciaries who should have most to gain from the development
of such initiatives. Meanwhile, the potential of a Fairtrade Climate
Standard to trigger positive outcomes for those involved in
producing FCCs is contingent on consumers’ willingness to pay
for them, and this still remains unknown.
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